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ATTI'l'\JDE CHANGE TOWARD A READING ASSIGNMENT 
Merlyn S. Swanson 
Loyola University of Chicago 
The purpose of this stud;y' was to test the effects of' Choice 
(whether or not students were given an opportunity to decide w11ether to do the 
assignment) and Incentive (whether or not students were promised class credit 
for doing the assignment) upon the subsequent attitudes of students toward 
doing a reading assignment and upon the students• comprehension of that 
reading assignment. Festinger•s "theory ot cognitive dissonance" was the 
theoretical framework from which the experimental hypotheses were developed. 
Six hypotheses were stated, consistent Vi.th the following expectations. It 
was expected that the Choice and Incentive variables would show an interaction 
in their effects upon students' attitudes toward doing the assignment. If' 
students were given a choice, their attitudes would be more positive when 
no incentive was provided than when the incentive was provided. If students 
were not given a choice, tneir attitudes would be more positive vnen the 
incentive was provided than when it was not. It was also expected that 
comprehension of' the reading assignment would be positively related to the 
incentive variable, and that the choice variable would not affect comprehensia • 
Eighty Junior higl1 school boys were taken f'rom their sWimming 
classes to be tested under the tour experimental conditions: (1) Choice-
Incentive, (2) Choice-No Incentive, (3) Bo Choice-Incentive, and (4) No 
Choice-No Incentive. Half of the subJects were allowed to decide whether 
: 
tn\'!Y would do the assignment, and aa.l:f were not. Half were promised class 
credit tor doing the assignment and half were not, depending upon experi-
mental group. 
A:t"ter completiDg the assignment, the subjects completed a 
rs.ting scale designed to asaesa their attitudes toward doiDg the assignment 
and a test ot their comprehension ot the assignment. 
The results did not contim all of the experimental hypotheses. 
Tne Incentive variable had no significant effect upon either the subjects' 
attitudes toward the assignment or their comprehension of the assignment. 
The Choice variable had no significant etfect upon the subjects' compre-
hension of the assignment. However, a highly significant relations.hip 
was found between the Choice variable and the subJects• subsequent attitudes 
tows.rd doing the assignment. Those who were given a choice .r...ad signifi-
cantly more favorable attitudes toward the assignment. 
These results, although not as expected, were consistent witi1 
dissonance theory. It was concluded that the promise of class credit was 
not an effective incentive. But giving the subJects a ch'.>ice in the matter 
of doing the assignment did result in dissonance-mediated attitude cnange 
toward the assignment. The main practical implication of these findings 
was that giving students more opportunities to choose their schoolwork 
may result in more favorable attitudes toward schoolwork. 
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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Attitude and Reading Assigrunents 
From the time a child has learned to read for meaning 
until the time he leaves school, reading assigr..ments are re-
current tasks. Reading assignments ir.ay occur in any subject 
area because reading cuts across subject-araa boundaries. 
Numerous educational objectives are associated with such assign-
ments. These objectives may be grouped into three categories. 
The first category is made up of subject content objectives. 
The goal is reading for the in.forrri.ation contained in the reading 
material. Examples of such objectives might be, "to be aware 
of current political issues'' or nto understand the Bill of 
Rights.n 
The second category is r:iade up of objectives that 
relate to the development of reading skills. The goal is that 
of learning to be a better reader. Examples of such objectives 
might be "to increase reading comprehension" 01"" .. t,.4 develop 
word recognition skills." 
The third category is made up of objectives that 
relate to the development of positive attitudes toward reading 
activities. While the first two categories of objectives are 
in the cognitive domain, these objectives are in the affective 
domain (Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1964). The goal is to learn 
to enjoy reading activities. Some examples of such objectives 
might be, "to appreciate the value of a reading assignment" 
or "to enjoy reading about American history." Such attitudinal 
objectives are very important, and educators are currently 
showing greater concern for student attitudes. After all, how 
a student feels about school will af'f ect what he gets out of 
school. How he feels about reading will affect his responses 
to reading assignments. Each school experience carries its 
own attitudinal impact, favorable or unfavorable. These 
experiences have a cumulative effect which shapes the student's 
total attitude toward school activities. Thus, it is important 
for educators to consider the aff eetive aspect of each assign-
ment. 
2. 
Despite the importance of affective outcomes, the 
systematic study of attitudes is in its infancy (Ammons, 1969). 
The present study was motivated by the premise that experimental 
investigation of affective outcomes can lead to better under-
standing, prediction, and control of affective outcomes. This 
understanding will enable educators to provide educational 
experiences that are more satisfying to students. The study 
focused upon one particular type of educational experience, 
the ubiquitous reading assignment. The purpose of the study 
was to investigate the effects of choice and incentive upon 
the subsequent attitudes of students toward a reading assiittlment. 
Theoretical Foundations 
Theory development is the means by which a behavioral 
science increases understanding, prediction, and control. 
Theory is the generalization that allows one to explain behavior-
al phenomena. and it states the relationships by which one 
predicts and controls those phenomena (Rescher, 1970). 'l'he 
purpose of the present study was intended to be achieved by 
extending and improving the theoretical foundations by which one 
may understand the affective outcomes of reading assignments. 
The theoretical framework tor the study was Festinger' 
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. His theory is one of 
the more important theories of attitude change. It also 
happens to be well suited for this study because it predicted 
attitudinal consequence of choice and incentive variables. 
The study was an attempt to test cognitive dissonance effects 
in a practical academic setting. 
Parallels to School Practice 
The study simulated, as closely as possible, a real 
school situation in order to maximize its applicability to 
actual school practices, while maintaining enough experimental 
control to obtain meaningful results. The experimental pro-
1'lhile systematically manipulating Choice and Incentive variables, 
and then assessing the students' attitudes toward the assignment. 
Because comprehension of the reading assignment was also an 
important outcome, it was assessed as a second dependent 
variable. 
School assignments typically require tir.le that the 
student would devote to pre.fer.red activities. To simulate 
this condition, the assignment given in this study was com-
pleted in school durine swimming class. All of the subjects 
had to give up their sw1mm.ing class in order to do the assign-
ment. 
The two experimentally manipulated variables were 
choice and incentive. Both of these variables may be manipu-
lated in making actual school assignments. A teacher might 
give students a choice as to whether or not they would do a 
particular assignment, or choice might be given by allo-wi.ng 
students to choose £rom alternative assignments. Also, the 
teacher may provide no choices. In this study the choice 
controlled was the students' .freedom to decide whether or not 
they would do the assignment. 
A teacher might provide incentives to students by 
promising class credit or by giving grades. Actually, grading 
might not be an incentive for those students who believe that 
they are incapable of obtaining good grades. Grading might 
carry a variety of incentive values for various st11A~n~e. 
Thus, course credit ~rould seem to be a more satisfactory 
incentive for experimental purposes. In this study, incentive 
referred to a promise of course credit for doing the assign-
ment. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
Basic Definitions 
Cognitive dissonance is a theoretical construct. It 
is not something that can be directly observed or measured, 
6. 
but it is a useful concept for predicting and explaining observed 
behavior. Theoretically, it is an intervening variable that 
mediates the effects of antecedent conditions upon consequent 
events, which in this case are attitude changes. The need 
for such a construct arises when observed attitude changes 
do not seem to be directly related to antecedent stimulus 
conditions. Thus, a mediating process is assumed. To a hard-
nosed scientist, it does not matter whether the mediating 
process really exists within the individual. The important 
factor is for the construct to accurately predict behavior. The 
theoretical. construct of cognitive dissonance is useful to the 
degree that its occurrence can be determined from objective 
antecedent conditions and the extent to which the predicted 
attitude changes can be demonstrated as consequent events. 
The original statement of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance was made by Leon Festinger (1957). His statement 
will be summarized in this chapter. The term ttcognitive" 
re.f'ers to th k 
one holds about one's self or one's environment. Cognitive 
elements, or cognitions, make up one's fund of knowledge. 
They represent reality to the individual, corresponding to 
what actually exists in the environment and in the individual's 
psychological world. Cognitive elements are "knowledges0 
(Festinger, 1957, Pp. 9). They are the basic units of attitude 
and belief that the individual holds to be valid. 
Cognitive elements are not completely independent, 
but they may be related to one another in various ways. For 
dissonance theory, three types of relationships are important. 
Cognitive elements may be consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant. 
If, in the individual's perception, two cognitive 
elements have nothing to do with each other, then one cogni-
tive element implies nothing about the other, and their 
relationship is said to be ttirrelevant." For example, the 
individual may know that school begins at nine o'clock, and 
he also may feel that eighteen-year-olds should be allowed 
to vote. These two elements of cognition have nothing to 
do with each other. Thus, they have an irrelevant relation 
to each other. 
Two cognitive elements are relevant to one another if 
one implies something about the other. According to Festinger 
(1957, Pp. 18), if two cognitive elements are relevant, their 
relation must be either consonant or dissonant. Two cognitive 
elements are said to be "consonanttt if, given one element, 
7. 
the other may be expected to follow. That is, the two elements 
seem consistent to the individual. For example, one may know 
that the weather forecast calls f'or rain and that he brought 
his umbrella with him. These two cognitive elements have a 
consonant relationship. 
Two cognitive elements are said to be "dissonantu if', 
given one element, the other may be expected not to follow. 
That is, the two elements seem inconsistent to the individual. 
Festinger (1957, Pp. 1.3) stated it this way: "These two 
elements are in a dissonant relation ii', considering these 
two alone, the obverse oi' one element would follow from the 
other." For example, an individual may know that his grade 
is precariously low in math, and yet he may choose to go out 
rather than doing his math assignment. These two cognitive 
elements have a dissonant relationship. 
Dissonance may be better understood by reviewing the 
sources from which Festinger (1957, Pp. 14) suggests it may 
arise. (l) Dissonance might arise from logical inconsistency. 
For example, an individual might believe that he will receive 
an "A" in history, and he may feel that he is incapable of 
passing the final exam in that course. The two cognitions 
are not logically consistent. (2) Dissonance might arise from 
cultural mor~s. For example> an individual may know that he 
cheated on a civics exam, and he may understand that such 
cheating is morally wrong. His behavior is inconsistent with 
8. 
what he knows he should do. (3) Dissonance might arise from 
a specific opinion which, by definition, is included in a 
more general opinion. For example, an individual may be a 
supporting member of a liberal student organization, and he 
may be in favor of consorship of campus speakers. The latter 
opinion is inconsistent with the more general opinion. 
(4) Dissonance might arise from past experience. For example, 
an individual might receive a failing grade on his final 
report, and he might recall that he passed all of the assign-
ments and tests in that course. His present experience is 
inconsistent with his past experiences. 
Basic Principles 
The fundamental assumption upon which the theory of 
cognitive dissonance is based is that there is a pressure 
within the individual to produce consonant relationships 
9. 
among cognitions and to avoid and reduce dissonant relation-
ships. The focus of dissonance theory is upon the hypotheti-
cal condition ttcognitive dissonanee 11 which arises when cognitive 
elements are in a dissonant relationship. The theory states 
that the existence of dissonance creates psychological tension 
or discomfort which will motivate the individual to reduce 
the dissonance and to avoid further dissonance. The basic 
postulate of the theory is that the existence of dissonance is 
a drive state which motivates the individual to reduce the 
dissonance and to achieve consonance or consistency in his 
cognitions. 
The theory deals with relations between pairs 0£ 
cognitive elements. It is recognized that there may be many 
additional elements 0£ cognitiDn that are consonant with 
either of the two elements under consideration. But the 
two-element simplification is sufficient for the theory. 
10. 
It is also recognized that dissonance may exist in 
varying degrees, Two factors determine the magnitude of 
dissonance. The magnitude of dissonance will increase as a 
function of the importance of the dissonant elements to the 
individual, It will also depend upon the proportion of 
relevant elements that are dissonant with the one in question, 
Thus Festinger (1957, Pp. 18) states that the total amount of 
dissonance that exists between two clusters of cognitive 
elements will be a function of the proportion of all relevant 
relations between the dissonant clusters of elements when 
the clusters are waighted according to their importance. 
Dissonance Reduction 
Cognitive dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce 
the dissonance, and the strength of those pressures is a 
function of the magnitude of the dissonance. The drive to 
reduce dissonance may result in various nodes of dissonance 
reduction. In general, dissonance reduction is achieved by 
changing one of the dissonant elements. 
ll. 
One mode of dissonance reduction is changing a behavior 
al cognitive element. For example, if an individual starts 
out for a picnic and it begins to rain 1 he may reduce the 
dissonance between going on a picnic and knowing that it is 
raining by goi..~g back home. 
Another mode of dissonance reduction is changing an 
environmental element. For example, if an individual who 
seems likely to become president of an organization feels 
inadequate for that position, he may reduce the dissonance 
between the likelihood of becoming president and his feelings 
of inadequacy by throwing his support over to another candi-
date. 
Another mode of dissonance reduction is adding new 
cognitive elements or changing existing ones. For example, 
if an individual who smokes believes that smoking is hazardous 
to his health, he may reduce the dissonance between smoking 
and the heal th hazard by deciding that stopping &'1loking would 
result in an unhealthy gain in weight or by minimizing his 
confidence in the smoking research. 
One cannot readily predict from dissonance theory 
which mode of dissonance reduction .an individual will employ. 
According to Festinger (1957, Pp. 24), cognitive elements have 
varying degrees of resistance to change. It r::ay be extrECely 
difficult for an individual who is ''in contact with reality0 
12. 
to deny the mer:;ory of his behavior or to change his perception 
of somethin~ concrete in his environment. However, opinions 
and attitudes may be more susce~tible to change. Theoretically. 
the individual who is sui"ficiently motivated to reduce disaonance 
will change the ele;jent that is least resistent to change. 
In dissorumce research, the experhlenter will, 
typieally, block all "lt.ernative modes of dissonance reduction 
except tor ·tho cognition that is to be changed. Dissor.tance 
is experimentally cr.ated in order to motivate the individual 
to change that particular cognitive element. T'nat change 
is measured as evidence for the existence of the cognitive 
dissonance. For example, college men who were opposed to 
the draft were induced to make up a tape recorded speech in 
support of the draft. A control group of college m.en were 
asked to read pro-draft material into a tape :recorder. The 
attitudes of the two groups were measured baf ore and after 
they gave their speeches or read the material. It waa found 
that the group that rr.ade up pro-draft speeches changed their 
opinions toward the dratt more than the control group 
(Featinger, 1957, Pp. 104). 
CHAPTER III 
DEVELQPf,;ENTS IN DISSONANCE THEORY 
Proposed Modifications of the Theory 
Festinger's initial statement of the theory of 
~ognitive dissonance was followed by a flurry of critical 
.nvestigation. Initially, the research activity was preoccupied 
Id.th validation of the theory. As a result a number of modif'i-
~ations or revisions have been proposed. These modifications 
~ave been proposed by investigators who accepted dissonance 
~heory in general, but who felt that some revision would improve 
~he correspondence between the theory and the data to which it 
lpplied. Generally, the proposed modifications specify limiting 
:onditions within which the theory is valid. The data that 
)rompted the suggested revisions will not be reviewed here. 
Brehm and Cohen (1962) proposed that commitment was 
m essential factor in dissonance theory. They discussed the 
·elation of dissonance theory to conflict theories and reported 
several studies, building a case f".)r their suggested revision. 
3rehm and Cohen took the position that if a person makes a 
iecision without commitment, he is free to change his mind, and 
~ould experience no dissonance. To the degree that the indivi-
iual chooses to make a particular commitment, he must live with 
lis decision. Thus the opportunity for the dissonance state 
13. 
0£ psychological diacomf ort exists because of the corunitrnent to 
the inconsistent elai:1ent rather than because of the existence 
of the inconsistent element. 
Featinger (1964) took into account the modifications 
which Brehm and Cohen suggested in describing aor:ie modifica-
tions of his own. His second book on cognitive dissonance was 
exclusively ,;oncerned with dissonance as it relates to 
decision rr.aking. Festinger accepted the notion of Brehm and 
Cohen that cormlitment was necessary in order for dissonance to 
occur. However• ha enlarged the concept of corr.rd t.ment to 
include not only situations in which an individual chooses 
to take a public stand, but any situation in which the 
decision unequivocally affects subsequent behavior. In other 
words, the commitnumt nect not be overt, but r..ay be implied by 
the individual's behavior. Festinger also indicated that the 
amount of dissonance that exists after a decision has been 
nade is a direct function of the number of things a person 
knows that are inconsistent with that particular decision. 
The more difficulty or conflict the person has experienced 
in making the decision, the greater would be the amount of 
dissonance generated and the tendency to justify that decision 
afterwards. Dissonance reduction following a decision would 
take the forr:i ot increasing the attractiveness of the rejected 
alternative. Thus, following a decision, a cognitive process 
occurs that acconplishes a spreading apart of the attractiveness 
of the alternatives available to the decision maker. For 
example, girls were given infonnation about two hypothetical 
applicants for the position of vice president of a company. 
A~er choosing one of the applicants, the girls tended to 
enhance the qualities of the chosen applicant as compared to 
the qualities of the unchosen applicant (Festinger, 1964, 
Pp. 12-15). 
Greenpole (1968) felt that when you strip down 
dissonance theory, it can be stated in a simple mathematical 
formulation. Cognitive dissonance is generated by two 
factors. The first factor is "post decision inconsistency" 
which is the amount of information that the individual has 
that is inconsistent with the decision he has made. The 
second factor is "decision importance" which is simply the 
subjective importance of the decision to the individual. 
These two factors should summate to determine the amount of 
dissonance experienced by the individual. Greenpole's 
suggestion ~hat decision is essential for dissonance to be 
generated seems similar to the idea that commitment is a 
necessary precondition. 
15. 
Aronson (196$) discussed the importance of individual 
differences in relation to dissonance theory, and he suggested 
that self-concept is a major factor in dissonance theory. 
According to Aronson, the source of dissonance is inconsistency 
between cognitions and self-concept. Dissonance occurs when 
a person behaves in a manner that is inconsistent with his 
views of himself as a person. This proposed modification 
restricts the applicability of dissonance theory considerably. 
Dissonance theory would not apply to situations in which the 
individual has inconsistent cognitions about the external 
environment. It would only apply to situations in which one 
of the inconsistent cognitions relates to the individual's 
self-concept. 
Bramel {1968) similarly emphasized the individual 
in relation to dissonance theory. He did not agree with 
Aronson that the individual's self-concept must be directly 
involved in the dissonance. Bramel felt that the individual's 
self-concept need be only indirectly involved. He stated 
that dissonance arises when (1) the individual encounters 
information that disconfirms an expectation, or {2} when he 
discovers that he has chosen inco~petently or immorally. 
Dissonance is "a type of anxiety" which is a feeling of per-
sonal unworthiness. 
Zimbardo (1969) related dissonance theory to 
instrumental behavior theory. His concern was not with the 
conditions under which dissonance is generated but with the 
factors that determine the amount of dissonance generated. 
He stated that dissonance will be greater as (1) the perceived 
freedom of choice increases, (2} the initial drive level 
increases, (3) the severity of anticipated future deprivation 
16. 
or stimulation increases, and (4) the incentive for justifi-
cation of com.~itment to deprivation or excessive stimulation 
decreases. The measurement of differential amountsof dissonance 
is far from precise. Further research will be required to 
refine both theory and methodology regarding the differential 
measurement of dissonance. 
Criticisms of the Theory 
Soma authors have been particularly critical of the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. They have said that the 
theory is inadequate or unnecessary. !·icGuire (1966, Pp. 492) 
described the situation. trover the past three years, 
dissonance theory continued to generate more research and 
more hostility than any other one approach." 
The strongest criticism was the critical review by 
Chapanis & Chapanis (1964). These authors criticized the 
theory on the basis that it was too simple to account for 
"the essentials of a complex social situation." They also 
criticized the eA1Jerimental validation of the theory on two 
bases. First, they felt that no valid conclusions could be 
drawn from cognitive dissonance research because the experi-
mental manipulations were too complex and the crucial variables 
too confounded. Second, they noted a number of methodological 
problems among the research studies. 
There have been a nunber of replies to Chapanis and 
Chapanis' criticisns. Kiesler, Collins, and T~iller (1969) 
replied that Chapanis and Chapanis were r:iisled hy the 
simplicity of Festinger's hypothesis. Festinger emphasized 
a two-element simplification for research purposes, but this 
two-element simplification was not intended to represent the 
coraplexity of a real social situation. Chapanis and Chapanis 
also failed to take into account some important factors in 
their evaluation of the theory, such as the amount of data 
that has been accounted for by the theory. Criticisms on 
the basis that the theory departs .from cuatonary views of 
behavior are unjustified. Silverman (1964) also replied to 
Chapanis and Chapanis' criticisms. He stated that, while 
Chapanis and Chapanis criticized dissonance theory, they did 
not present any satisfactory alternative explanation for the 
findings. Also, many of the "methodological inadequacies" 
were acceptable experimental procedures. 
Rosenberg has been an outspoken critic of dissonance 
theory. His first criticism (Rosenberg, 1965) was published 
at the same time as a criticism by Janis and Gilmore (1965), 
and the two articles were renarkably parallel. Both said 
that some dissonance data could be accounted for by experi-
mental contaminants, and both presented a study- to support 
their positions. One contaminant called Haffect arrousal 11 
by Rosenberg was similar to what Janis and Gilmore called 
"biased scanning." Their notions were that experiments on 
counter-attitudinal advocacy predisposed subjects to think 
of all the arguments they could in order to justify what 
they were doing. The larger the incentive, the greater would 
be the subject's motivation to think up such arguments. 
However, if the incentive were too big, it would cause sus-
picion and fear of being exploited. Thus there would be a 
negative incentive effect (Janis & Gilmore, 1965). "Evalua-
tion apprehension", which is a desire to show the experimenter 
that one cannot be bribed, may also account for negative 
incentive effects (Rosenberg, 1965). These arguments have 
led to considerable debate as to whether dissonance effects 
can be explained on the basis of experimental contaminants 
(Rosenberg, l966a & 19661:;. Some review authors have shown 
that there is considerable support for dissonance theory in 
studies that have eliminated alleged sources of contamination 
(Aronson, 1966; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). 
Bem (l967a & l967b) has proposed another interpreta-
tion of dissonance data based upon "self-perception." 
According to his argument, an individual observes his own 
behavior and interprets his own internal status in terms of 
what he sees himself doing. Thus, if an experimenter can 
induce a subject to behave in some manner that is contrary 
to the subject's attitudes, that subject will reinterpret 
his attitude in terms of his behavior. Subjects who comply 
19. 
20. 
with an experinent for a large reward are less likely to believe 
that their behavior reflects their true attitudes than subjects 
who comply for a sr:iall reward. :Mills (1967) and others have 
pointed out that this alternative explanation could apply to 
only a small portion of the dissonance studies, and so it is 
less satisfactory than the dissonance explanation. 
Other criticisms of dissonance theory will be mentioned 
in the next sectioni but those summarized in this section 
have been the major attacks upon the theory. They have not 
done mortal damage to the theory. In fact, they have probably 
stimulated a considerable amount of supportive research. 
Current Status 
Examination of the literature leads to the conclusion 
that the theory of cognitive dissonance has been one of the 
most controversial and influential theories in t~a area of 
attitude change. Almost all of the research has been theory 
oriented, and cognitive dissonance has been essentially a 
laboratory phenomenon. There have been very few attempts to 
demonstrate cognitive dissonance effects outside of the 
laboratory. The many criticisms of the theory have not 
produced satisfactory alternative explanations for cognitive 
dissonance data. However, they have resulted in refinement 
and modifications. 
Recent reviews (Aronson, 1963; Kiesler, Collins, & 
fe~iller, 1969; Shaw &. Kostanzo, 1970) note that dissonance 
theory has continued to gain importance and scientific 
rrespectability1•• 1'hese same authors have noted some problems 
in the current status of the theory which -vdll require addi-
tional attention. The most frequently mentioned problern is 
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that of ambiguity in the definitions of cognitive dissonance 
concepts. For example, Pepitone (1966) noted that it is 
essentially impossible to specify what is a "cognitive element". 
Neither can one clearly specify l>!hen one cognition is 
':psychologically obverse" in its relationship to another. 
Perhaps what is psychologically inconsistent to one individual 
will not be to another. 
Another problem is that of specifying just when and 
how dissonance reduction behavior will occur. There are 
apparently varying degrees of cognitive dissonance, and the 
theory does not perr.iit neasure..inent of dissonance other than 
on an ordinal scale. When dissonance is present, more than 
one mode of dissonance reduction may be available to the 
individual. The theory does not provide a clear means for 
determining which mode of dissonance reduction will be em-
ployed. Typically, experimenters have found it necessary to 
block all but one avenue for dissonance reduction. 
Finally, the need for several revisions to the theory 
which have already been discussed suggests that the theory, 
in its currant form, does not su.fficiently predict all of the 
data. In its simplicity, the theory of cognitive dissonance 
~1a.s failed to recognize several important variables. Some 
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of these variables hava been identified and may be incorporated 
into the theory at some future time. 
In. sumuia.tion, the theory of cognitive dissonance has 
proved its value in predicting attitude change. It is far 
frora per.feet, but it has been widergoing a refinement process. 
Judgine from. the literature, there is consiaerable current 
interest in dissonance theory. It is expected that additional 
refinenent will be made in the future, and that the theory 
of cognitive dissonance will becon1e an increasingly use£ul 
tool for understanding hum.an attitude changes. 
CHAPTER r.J 
THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE AND INCENTIVE 
IN DISSONANCE RESEARCH 
Choice as an Independent Variable 
Choice is a central factor in dissonance theory 
(Aronson, 1966). The literature more frequently refers to 
"decision", but the term "decision" implies that there has 
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been a choice (Greenwald, 1968). Many of the studies of 
cognitive dissonance have used choice as an independent variable. 
This was the subject of Festinger's 1964 work. The amount of 
dissonance that results from a choice or decision was described 
as a direct function or the number of cognitions the individual 
has that are inconsistent with the choice or decision. The 
dissonance is manifest by a tendency to justify the decision 
after it has been made. Justification is a dissonance-reduction 
mechanism which may be accomplished by increasing the attrac-
tiveness of the chosen alternative or by subjective1y 
decreasing the attractiveness of the rejected alternative 
(Festinger, 1964). 
Considerable support for this postulate may be found 
outside of Festinger' s own works. One type of supporting 
evidence comes from studies employing the "forced compliance 
paradigm" which has to do 'With the situa1;ion in which the 
to his beliefs or attitudes. Subjects who have chosen to comply 
with experimenters' requests that they take a public stand in 
opposition to their private belief tended to see their counter-
attitudinal position as more attractive (Rabbie, et. al., 1959; 
Kiesler & DeSalvo, 1967; Kiesler, Pallak, & Kanouse, 1968). 
Similarly, subjects who have been induced to do an unpleasant 
task have tended to see that task as more pleasant {Brehm, 1959; 
Brehm, 1960; Cook, 1969; Helmreich, 1968). 
Another type of supporting evidence comes from studies 
in which changes in individuals' attitudes toward choice 
alternatives have been measured after the individual has made 
a choice. Subjects' attitudes toward chosen appliances 
(Brehm, 1956), toys (Brehm & Cohen, 1959), and job candidates 
(Penner, Fitch, & Weik, 1966) shifted to favor the chosen 
alternative after the decision had been made. Gerard {l967a) 
showed that the amount of attitude change due to dissonance 
was greater under conditions of high dissonance (when the 
alternatives were close in value) than under conditions of 
low dissonance (when alternatives were disparate in value). 
A third type of supporting evidence is more closely 
related to the proposed study. Studies in which the freedom 
of choice was the independent variable have shown that under 
conditions of greater choice, more dissonance results than 
under conditions of less freedom of choice. Subjects who 
read a negative evaluation to another person changed their 
opinion of that person more negatively under Choice conditions 
than lro Choice conditions (Davis & Jones, 1960). Subjects who 
wrote counter-attitudinal essays on "Why I Would Like to Become 
a Catholic" showed more pro-Catholic attitude change under 
Choice conditions than under No Choice conditions (Brock, 1962). 
Subjects who ad~inistered shock to others minimized the shock 
more under Choice than No Choice conditions (Brock & Buss, 1962). 
Subjects who performed a boring task minimized the boredom of 
the task more under Choice conditions thanuider No Choice 
conditions (Ryterband, & King, 1966). The recently published 
book by Zimbardo (1969) contains a number of studies employing 
choice as an independent variable. Some factorial studies 
using choice conditions as one of the variables will be dis-
cussed later. 
A problem arises with the choice variable because there 
are degrees of freedom of choice. The greater the freedom of 
choice allowed, the more subjects the experimenter is likely 
to lose. This loss of subjects is undesirable. The less the 
freedom of choice allowed: the less will be the difference 
between the Choice and No Choice conditions and the power of 
the experimental test. This loss of power is undesirable. 
Some studies employing Choice-No Choice conditions 
lose subjects from the Choice condition. According to Zimbardo 
(1969), the validity of the Choice condition must be questioned 
if subjects do not refuse to submit to the experiment. is 
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loss of refusing subjects is common in dissonance research, and 
it has been criticized as introducing bias in the subject selec-
tion. Zimbardo argued that bias could enter only if those who 
refused had lower thresholds for the relevant stimulation about 
which judgements were to be made. He showed that the refusing 
subjects were not affected any differently by food deprivation, 
dislike for eating grasshoppers, thirst, pain, and other 
stimulation about which judgements were to be made as the 
dependent variables in his research. 
It is difficult to have a Choice condition without 
ru.."Uling the danger of losing subjects. Some investigators 
such as Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) have used just 
enough inducement to assure that no subjects would be lost. 
However, this procedure reduces the freedom of choice and, 
with it, the difference between the Choice and No Choice 
conditions. In the current study, a real choice was offered 
to those subjects in the Choice condition, thus allowing them 
to refuse to participate. 
Incentive as an Independent Variable 
Another important independent variable in dissonance 
research is incentive. 'I'he term "incentive" has become 
standard in dissonance research, although this variable has 
also been called payment, reward, reinforcement value, etc. 
The a~ount cf dissonance that results from a decision depends, 
in part, upon the ar::ount of incentive given to select the 
chosen alternative. Individuals who make a choice with High 
Incentive for making that particular choice will experience 
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less dissonance than individuals t.mo ma.lee a choice under Low 
Incentive conditions {La,'lrence & Festinger, 1962). The dynamics 
of the incentive variable are that individuals who have less 
incentive for ma.king a decision have less justification for 
making that decision, and thus, experience more dissonance 
following the decision. There is considerable experimental 
support for this postulate in addition to the studies described 
in La:wre..11ce and Fe stinger's work. 
Mills (1958) found that children \mo cheated with 
Low Inc3ntive (toy value) changed their attitude to become 
more lenient toward cheating than children who cheated with 
High Incen~ive. However, those who did not cheat with Low 
Incentive becane more severe in their attitudes. Festinger 
and Carlsmith (1959) fowid that subjects in a Low Incentive 
($1) group who did a boring task tended to minir:iize the 
boredom or the task and had more favorable attitudes than did 
a High Incentive ($20) group. Students ·who felt overpaid on 
an hourly rate for doing an interviewing task produced more 
than those who felt equitably paid. But 11l1en students .felt 
overpaid on a piecework basis, their productivity was less 
thai."1 when they felt equitably paid (Adams &. Rosenbaum, 1962). 
BreJ:1.m (1962} showed that subjects wi10 committed thenselves to 
food or water deprivation rated themselves as less hungry or 
thirsty when paid $1 than when paid $5. Students who were 
induced to write an essay supporting an idea with ·which they 
disagreed changed their opinion more under a Low Incentive 
(pa;~1ent) condition than under a High Incentive condition 
(Gerard, l967b). Students who were u.viderraid (10¢) for doing 
an interviewing job tended to see the jct as more interesting 
than students who were equitably (25¢) pa.id (Lawler & O'Gara, 
1967}. When co1n.~tted to make a statement against their own 
beliefs, students in the Low Incentive ($ .50) condition 
showed more attitude change than students in the High Incentive 
($2.50) condition (Helmreich & Collins, 1968). 
The incentives employed in a school are seldom monetary. 
' They are usually ttgrades" or "creditn. No cognitive dissonance 
studies have been found that eri1ployed grades as incentives. 
One experiment used grades to vary the importance ot the 
subjects' decisions, but the way that the grades were used 
did not apply to the incentive variable (Mills, et. al., 1959). 
Only one study has bean found that employed class credit as 
an incentive {Holmes & Strickland, 1970). The effects of the 
class credit variable were similar to those found in other 
studies employing monetary incentives. That study will be 
described later in this chapter. 
The timing of the incentive is a critical factor in 
dissona.."lce research. This fact vra.s discovered when Rosenberg 
(1965) failed ·t;o find dissonance effects under certain temporal 
conditions. Subsequently, the effects of timing have been 
further studied and are better understood. Linder, Cooper, 
and Jones (1967) reported two studies in which students were 
asked to write counter-attitudinal essays under Choice and 
No Choice conditions and High ($2.50) and Low ($ .;o) 
Incentive conditions. Subjects were info:rr1ed about the in-
centive either before or after making their decisions. The 
inverse relationship between incentive and attitude change 
occurred only \'t'hen the subjects were informed about the 
incentive before making their decisions whether or not to 
coniply tlith the experiment. W'nen they were inf'ormed about 
the incentiva after making their decisions, a direct relation-
ship was obtained. Rossomando and Weiss (1970) al.so assessed 
the influe:iee of tit'ling of the incentive variable. Students 
were told that they would receive $1.;o or $5.00 for writing 
a countar-attitudinal essay in favor or raising tuition. The 
inverse relation between incentive and attitude change was 
found only when the subjects were paid after the measurement 
of' attitude change wa3 ma.de. When the subjects were paid 
before measuring attitude change, a direct relationship was 
found. 
Two additional studies might easily be confused as 
applying to this same incentive-time interaction, but they do 
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not. Hel.wreich (1968) fow1d an interaction between a:nourit of 
jus-c;i.fication an<i the timillb of the justification. Justifi-
cation has not beer. equated to incentive, and shouJ.d not be 
confused with the incentive variable. Cook (1969) iound a 
time-incentive interaction. However, the time variable was 
not the timing of the incentive, but the timing of the 
attitude assesSitent. 
The current study did not employ the kind of monetary 
rewards that have served as incentives for most dissonance 
studies. Rather, course credit was promised as an incentive. 
Whether course credit would be equivalent to monetary relm.rds 
was not known, but it is the kind of incentive most frequently 
used in schools. 'l'he hypotheses assumed that the two kinds 
of incentives would have equivalent effects. 
No time variable was included in tiie study. The 
experiu1ental p1,ocedure took into account the effects of 
timing upon the relationship between incentive and attitude 
change so that the effects of the incentive .-rould not be 
negated by improper timing. The subjects were ir..fon:ied o! 
the incentive before deciding whether to comply, and the 
incentive object (course credit) was not given before the 
attitude change measurement. 
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Choice .x Inee:ntive Interaction 
Three recent dissonance studies have varied both 
choice and incenti"1e conditions with similar results. When 
subjects were given-freedore of choosing whether to comply, 
incentive size has been inversely related to attitude change. 
But when subjects were given no choice, incentive size has 
been directly related to attitude change. tinder, Cooper, 
a.~d Jones (1967) found thes~ relationships in an experiment 
in which students "l.rere asked to irJrite a counter-attitudinal 
essay advocating a ban on college speakers. The ineentives 
were $ .;o a,,."ld $2.50. Holmes and Strickland (1970) employed 
three incenti7e conditions in ·which students were told that 
they would receive zero, 0ne, or two hours of experiment 
credit for their psycholoBY class. Half of the subjects were 
given a choice as to whether or not they would participate, 
and half were given no choice. A pre-test showed that the 
attitudes of the volunteers and the non-volunta~rs ware not 
different. The subjects wrote a counter-attitudinal essay 
on student involvement in university affairs. In the Choice 
condition, attitude change wa:3 inversely related to incentive. 
But in the No Choice condition, attitude change was directly 
related to ineenti~;e. Sherman {1970) did a similar experiment 
in which students were paid $ .;o or $2.50 for writing a 
counter-attitudinal essay against instituting a week-long 
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reading period. In the Choice condition, attitude change was 
inversely related to incentive. But in the No Choice condition, 
a positive relationship wae found. 
In the three studies reported above a similar inter-
action between Choice and Incentive conditions was found. 
When the subjects were given an opportwlity to choose whether 
or not to participate, dissonance was created because they 
had chosen to perform a somewhat disagreeable task. Dissonance 
theory predicted that cognitive dissonance would be greater 
the smaller the incentive because greater incentive would 
provide greater justification for making the affirmative choice. 
Thus attitude change would be greater as the incentive was 
decreased, yielding an inverse relationship between incentive 
and attitude change. When the subjects were given no oppor-
tunity to choose whether or not to participate, dissonance 
was not created by choosing to do a disagreeable task. Under 
the No Choice condition. greater incentive tended to result in 
greater attitude change, yielding a direct relationship 
between incentive and attitude change. 
For this study, an interaction between choice and 
incentive effects upon dissonance-mediated attitude change 
was predicted. The hypotheses for the study were consistent 
with the findings of the studies reported above. 
Effects of Choice and Incentive Conditions 
Dissonance research is generally concerned with 
attitude change. Cognitive dissonance brings about a readiness 
to perceive certain stimulus conditions in dissonance-reducing 
ways. The specific attitude change that occurs depends upon 
the nature of the experiment, and several types of changes 
have been shown to result from the freedom of choice variable. 
Subjects who have written counter-attitudinal essays have 
changed their attitudes more in the direction of their written 
statements under the choice condition than under the No 
Choice condition, except when incentives W'ere added to the 
experimental procedure (Brock, 1962; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 
1967; Holmes, & Strickland, 1970; Sherman, 1970). Subjects 
who have read a negative evaluation to a person had more 
negative attitude change under the Choice condition than under 
the No Choice condition (Davis & Jones, 1960). Subjects who 
administered shocks to another person minimized the painful-
ness of the shock more under the Choice condition than under 
the No Choice condition (Brock & Buss, 1962). Subjects who 
engaged in boring tasks had more positive attitudes toward 
the tasks under the Choice condition than under the No Choice 
condition (Brehm & Cohen, 1959; Ryterband & King, 1966). 
The present study predicted that Choice and No Choice 
conditions would affect dissonance-mediated attitude change 
.,,,..... ... >_ .... ··~~- ·----·-·· ~ .... 
toward an assigned reading task. Thus, attitude toward the 
reading task was one of the dependent variables. A perfor-
mance variable, comprehension or the reading material, was 
the other dependent variable. High and Low choice conditions 
have not been shown to affect such a performance variable. 
Thus, it was predicted that the choice condition would not 
affect comprehension of the reading material. 
The incentive variable has been shown to be an im-
portant variable in studies of dissona..~ce-mediated attitude 
change. The specific effects of incentive depend upon the 
nature of the experir11e11t. Subjects who advocated. a counter-
attitudina1 idea in an essay or verbal statement changed 
their opinion to confor~ more closely to the one expressed 
under Low Incentive conditions than under High Incentive 
conditions, except when they were not allowed freedom of 
choice (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Gerard, 1967; Linder, 
Cooper & Jones, 1967; Helmreich & Collins, 1968; Holmes & 
Strickland, 1970; Rossomando & Weiss, 1970). The greater the 
incentive to cheat, the more severe became the attitudes of 
children who resisted temptation and the more lenient became 
the attitudes of those who cheated (~tt.lls, 1958). The 
smaller the monetary incentive for food or water deprivation, 
the more subjects minimized their hunger or thirst (Brehm, 
1962). The greater the payment, the more negative were the 
eventual attitudes of subjects toward a dull proofreading task. 
But measures of perfornance did not vary significantly (Cook, 
1969). Subjects paid by the hour produced more when they per-
ceived their pay as inequitably large. But when paid on a 
piecework basis, ·they produced less when they perceived their 
pay as inequitably large (Ada.ms & Rosenbaw:1, 1962). Subjects 
who were paid an inequitably low wage tended to see their 
intervie~dng jobs as nore interesting and less important than 
did better paid subjects. They also produced more interviews, 
but the interviews were poorer in quality (Lawler & O'Gara, 
1967). 
The current study predicted that incentive conditions 
would affect dissonance-mediated attitude change toward an 
assigned reading task. That is, the measured attitudes of 
the subjects to-wa.rd the task would show an interaction between 
Choice and Incentive conditions. Under the High Choice condi-
tion, the subjects' attitudes toward doing the res.ding assignment 
would be directly related to the amount of incentive provided. 
Under the No Choice condition, the subjects' attitudes toward 
doirig the assigru!lent would be inversely related to the an1ount 
of incentive provided. 
Some studies have shown effects of incentive conditions 
upon performance measures, but there has not been consistency 
in the Jr..ind of perfor.:nance for l"Jhich the incentive ·was given. 
Cognitive dissonance, or attitude change resulting .from 
dissofl.ance, has not been shown to i'.1ave any syste>atic affect 
upon perf orn1a.:nce measures. Thus the present study predicted 
that the Incentive conditions would af£ect performance on the 
reading task, but, Choice conditions would not. The subjects' 
comprehension of the reading assignment would be directly 
related to the aoount of incentive provided, irregardless of 
Choice condition. 
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CHAPTER V 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted as part of the development 
procedure for the current study. The pilot study employed 
only·one independent variable, a Choice and No Choice variable. 
No incentive variable was employed. There were two dependent 
variables. One was the subjects' judgements regarding the 
difficulty of the reading assignment, and the other was the 
subjects' comprehension of what they had read. Dissonance 
was varied by manipulating the choice conditions. Two 
hypotheses were tested relating dissonance effects to each of 
the two dependent variables. 
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(l) Subjects who perceive that they have had a choice 
in the matter of reading difficult material will 
perceive that material as lese difficult than 
subjects who have been given no choice. 
(2) Subjects who perceive that they have had a choice 
in the matter of reading difficult material will 
comprehend that material better than subjects 
who have been given no choice. 
The subjects were randomly drawn from two fifth grade 
classes in an el~~cntary school located in a niddle-class 
community. The subjects were divided into two groups, with ten 
students in each group. The two groups were matched on the 
basis of sex and reading comprehension scores. Scores obtained 
on the Iowa Silent Reading Test were used for matching purposes. 
Table l shows the data upon which the two groups were matched. 
The reading material used for this pilot study was 
the story part of the Traxler High School Reading Test. 
At the end of the story, two questions were typed in order 
to r:ieasure the subjects' estimation of the difficulty of 
the reading material. Twenty comprehension questions about 
the reading material were reproduced separately. These 
questions were given to the subjects after they had finished 
the reading and had completed the two questions about its 
difficulty. Thus the comprehension questions could not 
influence the subjects' judgement about the difficulty of 
the reading material. T'nese materials may be seen in 
Appendix A. 
The two groups were tested during their regular school 
classes. The No Choice g.-roup 'Was given the Ko Choice in-
structions in 'Which they were simply told that they would do 
a difficult reading task. The Choice group was given Choice 
instructions in which they were allowed to decide whether 
or not to read the material. These instructions follow. 
TADLE l 
DATA UPON WHICH GROUPS WBRE MATCHED 
FOR THE PILOT STUDY• 
CHOICE GROUP NO CHOICE GROUP 
Subject Iowa Subject Iowa 
Uumber Sex Score fl umber Sex Score 
~-llil''I' A!ll'l~-... - ••• 
--
l F 10.0 ll F 10.2 
2 M 8.6 12 , 8.6 
3 F 8.l 13 M 7.9 
4 '" ?.l 14 M 1.0 ... ~ 
s , 6.S 15 F 6.3 
6 , 6.) 16 , 6.S 
7 F 6.0 17 F 6.o 
8 M 6.0 18 F 6.0 
9 M t· 1"' .) . ;) 19 M 5.5 
10 , s.2 20 M s.o 
_.......,..~--.....__,.,.--~--~-
" 
~ 
i Male ?•iea.n: 6.94 i v.ie Mean: 6.92 Female S.D.: 1.)7 Female S.D.: 1.46 
J9. 
--
~,'it..,. . ~- •1>1•1111•" '¢ --~ 
* 
Iowa Tests of Basic Skills, Reading Teet 
I am here to find out just how well fifth 
graders can do on a difficult reading task. 
In order to determine this, I have a story 
here for you to read. When you get this 
story, you simply read it at a natural 
speed. At the end of the story you will 
find two questions. After you have read 
the story and answered the two questions, 
raise your hand, and I'll come to your 
desk and give you another sheet with some 
more questions on it. 
(For the Choice condition only.) Now I 
don't want anyone to feel like he has been 
forced to do this. Whether or not you take 
part in this experiment is up to you. So 
I'm going to pass out some slips of paper. 
Just take one slip, put your name on it, 
and indicate whether you will take part. 
If you mark yes, of course, I'll give you 
the reading. But if' you mark no, just 
remain at your seat and work quietly. 
According to the first hypothesis, the subjects in 
the Choice condition should have perceived the reading 
material as more dif'ficult than subjects in the No Choice 
condition. Responses to the two questions designed to 
measure perceived difficulty failed to confirm this predic-
tion. Chi Square analysis indicated that the differences 
between the groups were not significant. 
According to the second hypothesis, the subjects in 
the choice condition should have comprehended the reading 
material better than those in the No Choice condition. The 
data did not support this prediction either. The mean raw 
score for the Choice group was 10.1 with a standard deviation 
2.86. The difference between these means obtained a t value 
of 1.89 which was not significant. Table 2 shows the compre-
hension data. 
4.].. 
Discussions with the students following the experiment 
led to some conclusions about the experiment. First, the 
measure of estimated reading difficulty was not successful. 
The questions designed to measure estimated difficulty level 
did not discriminate well because almost all of the subjects 
chose the sazne response. Secondly, the comments of the 
subjects suggested that their judgements regarding the 
difficulty of the reading material may not have been in-
fluenced by the experimental conditions. However, their 
attitudes about reading the material seemed to be noticeably 
affected by the different choice conditions. Third, the low 
scores on the comprehension test suggested that the reading 
material was too difficult for the fifth-grade students. 
The conclusions from the first pilot study suggested 
that a similar procedure could be employed with either older 
subjects or simpler reading material, if a satisfactory measure 
of the subjects' attitudes toward the reading assignment could 
be developed. A measure of attitude toward doing the reading 
assignment would relate more directly to dissonance theory as 
a dependent variable than the measure of estimated difficulty 
of the reading material. Subjects who disliked doing the reading 
assignment did not necessarily tend to see it as more difficult. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPREHENSION SCORES OBTAINED 
FROM THE PILOT STUDY 
.. ___ 
- -
-
CHOICE GROUP NO CHOICE GROUP 
-·- -----~ ...... 
Subject Raw Subject Raw 
Nurnber Score Number Score 
-
1 3 ll 9 
2 9 12 11 
3 6 13 13 
4 10 14 4 
5 10 15 9 
6 12 16 15 
7 17 17 10 
8 ll 18 ll 
9 10 19 10 
10 13 20 7 
- -
Mean: 10.l Mean: 9.9 
S.D.: 3.59 S .D.: 2.86 
,,,__,. _ _.....___._ . ...,,.. ,. 
Instrument Development 
A two-part rating scale was designed to measure 
attitudes toward the reading assignment. The scale contained 
two items with five choices each, arranged on a Likert scale. 
Both items were designed. to assess the subjects' degree of 
liking or dislike for the assignment. Scores on the two 
items were summed to yield total scores from 2 to lO. A 
small trial run was made to test the effectiveness of this 
instrwnent. 
Six seventh grade boys were taken from their gym 
classes and were given the story part of the Traxler High 
School Reading Test. Three of the subjects were given the 
Choice instructions, and three subjects with matching 
reading test scores were given the No Choice instructions. 
They read the assignment and filled out the attitude rating 
scale. The materials used appear in Appendix B. 
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The subjects' responses are shown in Table 3. There 
was a good spread of chosen responses, suggesting that the 
questions could discriminate variations in attitude. The 
attitude scores ranged from a score of 6 to a score of 10. The 
groups were far too small for this trial run to be considered a 
pilot test of any hypotheses. But the results suggested that 
the attitude scale would be adequate as a measuring instru-
ment for the purposes of the current study. 
TABLE 3 
RESPONSES TO THE ATTITUDE Pi.ATIMG SCALE 
Subject 
Question IJ l 
Question II 2 
Attitude Score 
Choice Group No Choice Group 
Hollister Benson Fehring Cohen Holste Labahn 
4 
...L 
7 
...l... 
6 
5 
....L 
10 
J 
-L 
6 
3 
...l... 
6 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMKNTAL PROCEDURE 
De-v-elopment of Research Hypotheses 
In the current study) the subjects were taken from 
their swimming classes to be given a reading assignment under 
varied experimental conditions. Following the reading, they 
completed the attitude rating scale and a test of their com-
prehension of the reading material. The two dependent variables 
assessed were the subjects' attitudes about doing the reading 
assignment, and their comprehension of the assignment. 
The subjects were divided into four groups to be 
called Choice-Incentive, Choice-No Incentive, No Choice-
Incentive, and No Choice-No Incentive. These four groups 
represented every possible combination of the two independent 
variables. Choice and No Choice represented whether or not 
the subjects were given an opportunity to choose not to do 
the assignment. Incentive and No Incentive represented 
whether or not the subjects were promised course credit for 
doing the assignment. 
It was expected that subjects in the Choice-No 
Incentive condition would experience cognitive dissonance. 
The perception that they have had a choice would be dissonant 
with the perception that they would have preferred to go to 
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swimming class. This dissonance would be a drive stimulus 
£or these subjects to change their attitude toward the reading 
assignment. They -W"Ould tend to see the assignment as more 
desirable, and ·thus reduce the dissonance. Therefore, in 
the absence of incentive, it was expected that the Choice 
group would show a more positive attitude toward the reading 
assignment than the No Choice group. 
Subjects in the No Choice-No Incentive group would 
not experience dissonance about complying with a relatively 
undesirable activity. Since they were given no choice, they 
would not have a cognition that they had chosen to do the 
task. They would not be motivated to enhance the desirability 
of the reading task. Thus, in the absence of incentive, 
their attitude toward the reading assigrunent would be more 
negative than that of the Choice-No Incentive group. These 
predictions were strongly suggested by the literature. 
Predictions concerning the subjects who were given 
the incentive were more tenuous. Research data were not 
available to show whether "class credit" would be consistently 
as effective an incentive as monetary rewards have been. The 
research hypotheses assumed that the effects 0£ class credit 
upon attitude change would be equivalent to the effects of 
monetary rewards. 
Half of the subjects were told that they would 
receive class credit for doing the reading assignment. Thia 
incentive should have reduced the dissonance of the subjects 
in the Choice condition because it provided justification 
for choosing to comply with the relatively undesirable 
reading activity. Thus subjects in the Choice-Incentive 
condition should not have been ~otivated to enhance their 
perception of the desirability of the reading assignment as 
much as subjects in the Choice-No Incentive group. 
Subjects who were given the incentive and were 
given no choice should have had more positive attitudes 
toward the reading assignment than subjects who were given 
47. 
no choice or incentive, simply because there was more to be 
gained from the reading assignment in the No Choice-Incentive 
condition than in the No Choice-No Incentive condition. It 
followed that a significant interaction was expected between 
Choice and Incentive conditions on the measure of attitude. 
No significant main effects were predicted. If prow.ising 
class credit were not equivalent to monetary rewards as an 
incentive, a different pattern of effects would be obtained. 
The incentive variable would have no affect upon subsequent 
attitudes toward the reading assignment. There would be no 
significant main effect of the incentive variable and no 
significant interaction. However, there would. be a significant 
main effect of the choice variable. Both groups of subjects 
in the Choice condition would have been expected to show 
more positive att.itudes toward the reading assignment than 
both grcups cf subjects in the ~fo Choice condition. 
The measure of per:forr:u1nce ·was the subjects• scores on 
a test of their co~prehension of the reading assignment. The 
presenc~ or absence of dissonance relative to doing the assign-
n;ent does not carry direct implications regarding perforrnance. 
Thus, the Choice conditions were not expected to affect perfor-
m.a.nee on the reading task. 
If promising class credit for doin,<".'. the reading assign-
ment. were an ef.fective incentive, then by definiti.on, the 
incentive would rnot.iva.te the subjects to perform better. Thus 
the subjects in the Incentive groups were expected to do better 
on the perforrnance !·1e8.sure than sub.~ects in. the No Incentive 
groups. 
The hypotheses fnr the two analyses follow. They are 
baaed upon the above rationale. 
Students who choose to do a. reading assign-
ment and students who are not given a choice 
will net differ sienificantly in their 
attitudes toward doing that assignment. 
Students who are promised course credit for 
doing a reading assignment and students who 
are not promised course credit will not differ 
sientfica.ntl;:r in the~.r attitudes toward doing 
that assignn1ent. 
There will be a significant interaction 
hetw·een choice and course credit conditions in 
their eff ecta upon subsequent attitudes toward 
doing the reading assignment. 
Students who choose to do a reading a.ssig."1-
ment and students who are not given a choice 
will not;; differ significantly in t~heir 
comprehension of that reading material, 
Students 'Who are promised course credit for 
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doing a reading assignment will co1.:i.prehend 
that reading assign.~ent significantly better 
than students who are not promised course credit. 
'Xhere will be no significant int.eraction between 
choice and course credit conditions in their 
efiects upon subsequent. cOLlprehension of that 
reading material. 
Subjects 
The subjects for this study were eighty boys in the 
seventh and eighth p;rades at a suburban junior high sehool. Only 
boys who had scored !'rorn the thirtieth to the ninetieth percen-
tiles on the Reading Comprehension section of the Iowa Test of 
Basic Skills were included in the sampling population. Because 
one or the dependent variables was a reading comprehension 
measure, it was desirable to avoid large variances in reading 
comprehension skill. The greater the ~~thin-group variability 
due to differences in skill, the greater would l>e the error 
variance in the analysis. Generalizations from this study would 
apply to students within the mid-range of reading skill. 
The subjects w~re a"'isigned to the four experimental 
groups on a random basis. Three groups had ten seventh graders 
and ten eighth graders, an0 one group had nine seventh and eleven 
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eighth graders. It wa0 assur.ted that the pre-experimental attituda!! 
of students id.thin the mid-range of reading skill were relatively 
homogeneous, and that random assignment assured that between-group 
variations in attitudes ~rould be due solely to chance. 
Instruments 
The reading assignment was the Story Comprehension 
section ot the Traxler Silent Reading Test, Form l (Traxler, 1934) 
The story was reproduced so that the assignment would not look 
like a test. The attitude scale developed for this study was 
printed at the end of the story. 
Ten comprehension questions i-mich were part of the test 
were reproduced separately. They were given to the subjects after 
they had read the story and completed the attitude measure. Thus, 
the comprehension questions would not affect the subjects' 
~ttitude ratings. The materials used appear in Appendix c. 
Experimental Design and Method 
The study followed a 2 x 2 factorial design which 
provides for two experimental variables. The two variables, 
choice and incentive, were independently assigned to four ex-
perimental groups. 
The subjects were taken from their swimming classes 
in snall groups during a one-week period. The experimental 
instructions were read to them when they arrived at the 
experimenter's room. These instructions varied according to 
experimental condition as follows: 
I have asked you here to do a reading assign-
ment. This (hold up reading material) is the 
story that I want you to read. After you 
have finished the story there will be ques-
tions for you to answer about it. 
(Incentive conditions only) I w.lll give the 
resu1ts ·to your language arts teacher so that 
you will get credit for the assignment. 
(Choice condition only) Mow I don't want 
anyone to feel that he has been £creed to 
do this. If you want, I will make out a 
pass so that you can go back to gyn class. 
Now I'll pass out the story. Pleaae write 
your name on the front and read it at your 
own pace. At the end of the story you wi.ll 
find two questions. When you have answered 
them) give me back the story and I will give 
you some other questions to answer. Are 
there any questions about ·what. you are to do? 
The Choice condition allowed st.udents to not parti-
cipate, and twenty-tWt) students chose to retv.rn to their 
swimming classes. Percentile scores from the Reading Compre-
hension section of the Iowa. Tests of Basic Skills were 
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available on a.11 of the subjects. Fer.ms and sta.~dard deviations 
were calcu1ated fror:; these data in order to deterr:rl.nc that 
the four ex:perin1ental groups were si1:lilar in readinG compre-
hension skill. TablB I+ shcn::s these data. The means ranged 
TABLE i+ 
I'::.EANS AND STANDJIF\~ DEVIATIONS 
OF READil~G TEST PERCEl~TILE SCORES 
FOR THE FOUH EXPEnihENTAL GROUPS 
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:=~=-==========:::::::==========================================::1 
Incentive 
No Incentive 
Total 
CHOICE 
Mean• 59.30 
s.n. - 20.25 
Iviean = 54.25 
S.D. = 20.48 
Mean ... 56.78 
S.D. = 20.01 
NO CHOICE 
Mean • '57.55 
S .D. == 20.2g 
Mean = 55.70 
S.D. = 18.29 
Mean = 56.62 
s.n. - is.g4 
TOTAL 
Mean = 58.42 
S.D. D 19.76 
Itiean = ;4. 98 
S.D. = lct.9) 
Mean = 56.70 
S.D. = 19.20 
from 54.25 to 59.30. It may be noted that the mean scores for 
subjects in the Choice {;Toups were very close to the mean 
scores of the subjects in the No Choice groups. Thus, there 
uas no tendency to C.e left with better readers in the Choice 
groups due to poorer readers choosing not to participate. 
Except for the instructions given, all of the experi-
mental groups were treated alike. The reading assignment was 
passed out. The subjects read the story and filled out the 
attitude scale. The experimenter checked to see that the 
subjects' names were on their papers and that the attitude 
scales had been filled out before giving tha~ the sheet of 
comprehension questions to answer. All of the subjects were 
fully cooperative. The attitude rating scale and the compre-
hension questions were scored, and these raw scores were the 
measures of attitude a.nd performance used in the analysis. 
Analysis 
The ti10 dependent variables were the subjects' 
attitude scorss and their comprehension scores. A two-way 
analysis of variance with fixed effects was calculated from 
each set of da.ta.. The calculations were done in the manner 
prescribed by Guilford (1956, p. 296). 
Three relations..'1ips were tested with each of the two 
dependent variables. (1) There ri:tc:1:..c havs been a significant 
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main effect relationship between Choice conditions and the 
dependent variable. (2) There might have been a significant 
main effect relationship between Incentive conditions and the 
dependent variable. (3) There might have been a significant 
interaction between the Choice and Incentive conditions. A 
criterion probability level ot .05 was selected for determining 
whether a relationship was significant. 
CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis ot Attitude Data 
The first three hypotheses predicted the efi'ects of 
Choice and Incentive variables upon the subsequent attitudes 
ot the subjects toward doing the reading assignment. They 
predicted no significant main effects, but that a significant 
interaction between the two independent variables would be 
obtained. 
;;. 
Figure l displays the distributions ot attitude 
scores obtained from the tour experimental groups. The higher 
scores indicated more favorable attitudes. Table 5 shows 
the means and standard deviations tor the tour groups based 
upon the same data. The mean attitude scor~ or 1.00 tor 
the Choice-Incentive group was the highest. The mean 
attitude score tor the Choice-No Incentive group was 6.30. 
The mean score for the No Choice-Incentive group was 5.75, 
and the mean score for the No Choice-No Incentive group was 
;.25. 
Table 6 shows the summary table for the analysis of 
variance calculated from the attitude scores. The predicted 
interaction effect was not obtained, nor was there a signifi-
cant Incentive main effect. However, there was a highly 
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TABLE 5 
KEANS AND STAflIDARD DEVIATIONS OF 
ATTITUDE SCORES FOR THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
CHOICE NO CHOICE TOTAL 
_, 
Mean== 7.00 Mean == ;.7; Mean == 6.38 
Incentive 
S.D. == 1.00 S.D. == 1.79 S.D. = l.;; 
-
Mean= 6.)0 Mean = ;.2; Mean = ;.78 
No Incentive 
S.D. = 1.76 S.D. = 1.45 S.D. = 1.64 
- ---· --
____ ........ ___ .... ___ _... 
Mean= 6.65 Mean = 5.;o Mean == 6.08 
Total 
S.D. = 1.44 S.D. = 1.61 S.D. == 1.62 
significant main effect of the Choice variable (F = 11.8456; 
I?.< .Ol). Thus, the subjects who were given a choice had 
significantly more favorable attitudes toward the reading 
assignment than did the subjects who were not given a choice. 
5a. 
The relationships predicted by the first three 
experimental hypotheses were not confirmed. There was evidence 
of dissonance-mediated attitude change due to the Choice 
variable, but the Incentive variable had no significant 
effects upon attitude. Thus, both the Incentive and the 
No Incentive groups followed the pattern predicted for the 
No Incentive groups. The results were consistent with the 
relationships that were predicted if the promise of class 
credit were not an effective incentive (See page 47). 
Analysis of Performance Data 
The last three hypotheses predicted the eff ecta of 
Choice and Incentive variables upon the subsequent comprehen-
sion of the reading assignment. They predicted that there 
would be a significant main effect ot the Incentive variable, 
but there would be no significant main effect of the Choice 
variable and no significant interaction. 
Figure 2 displays the distributions of raw scores 
for comprehension obtained from the four experimental groups. 
The higher scores indicated greater knowledge of what had 
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TABLE 6 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
S UivTMARY TABLE 
BASED ON ATTITUDE SCORES 
·-
Source Sum of Degrees of Mean 
Squares Freedom Square F 
-- -
Choice 26.45 l 26.4500 11.8456* 
Incentive 7.20 l 7.2000 J.2245 
Interaction 0.10 l 0.1000 0.0448 
Within Sets 169.70 76 2.2329 
Total 203.55 79 
- .... ~. -~ 
• h?. < .Ol) 
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been read. Table 7 shows means and standard deviations for 
the four groups based upon the same data. The Choice-Incentive 
group obtained the :tighest mean comprehension score of 6. 65. 
The other three groups were very similar with means of 5.15 
for the Choice-No Incentive group, ;.2; tor the No Choice-
Incentive group, and 5.55 for the No Choice-No Incentive 
group. 
Table 8 shows the summary table for the analysis of 
variance calculated from the comprehension scores. No 
significant relationships were found, including the predicted 
main effect for the Incentive variable. Thus, the relation-
ships predicted by the last three experimental hypotheses 
were not confirmed. 
Conclusions 
The six experimental hypotheses were developed with 
the assumption that the promise of course credit would have 
, an incentive effect similar to that of monetary reward. 
This assumption was necessary because experimental evidence 
had not yet demonstrated that "course credit" was equivalent 
to monetary reward in its affects upon attitude and per-
formance. Failure to confirm the fifth experimental 
hypothesis indicated that "course credit" did not significantly 
affect perf or.mance. The mean comprehension scores shown in 
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TABLE 7 
MEAH3 AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 
cor,'fPREHENSION PERFOPJMI::CE SCOH.ES FOR THE 
FOUR EXPERIV!ENTAL GROUPS 
--
CHOICE NO CHOICE '.:L10TAL 
---------~------·-----~-_ .. ________ _, ...... ,. ... _. ____ ,.. 
Mean == 6.6S Mean = ;.2; Mean = 5.9; 
Incentive 
S.D. = 2 .. 16 S .D. == 2.33 S.D. 
-
2.30 
-·--
l•lean = 5.15 l<flear;. • 5.55 l<Iean == 5.3; 
No Incentive 
S.D. = 2.14 S.D. = 2.32 S .D. = 2.14 
-------...--- -·-,.. ------·-'_,.._ _______ ,,,_,, _______ ~-·---·,-·,,--,·~··-,.-,._ 
Total 
Mean= ;.90 
s.n. = 2.23 
Mean = 5.40 
S.D. = 2.27 
JViean = 5.6; 
S.D. == 2.24 
~--..,.------------...-- ... ·-· ··----~" -··--------------
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TABLE 8 
ANALYSIS OF VARIAf.YCE 
S U':>11iARY TAJL:S 
BASED OU COH.PREHENSION SCORF.S 
____ __....-.-.__.. ....... """' 
.,.,,.,,", . 
- -
Source Sum 0£ Degrees of Mear.'1. 
Squares Freedom Squares F 
Choice ;.oo l s.oooo l.0;03 
Incentive 7.20 1 7.2000 l.5124 
Interaction 16.20 l 16.2000 ;.40;0 
Within Sets 361.00 76 4.7605 
Total 390.20 79 
Table 6 did not even suggest an incentive effect. Thus it 
may be concluded that the promise of class credit "Was not an 
effective incentive. 
It was predicted on page 47 that 1£ offering 
"course credittt were not equivalent to a monetary incentive, 
only the main effect of the Choice variable upon attitude 
scores would be significant. This relationship is what the 
analysis .fowid. Because "course credit" was not an effective 
incentive, it had no effect either as a main effect or as 
an interaction effect in combination with the Choice variable. 
It follows that the interaction predicted by the third hypo-
thesis was not obtained. 
The dissonance effect of the Choice variable upon 
attitude was obtained as a main effect of the Choice variable. 
Subjects who were given a choice in the matter of doing a 
reading assign.~ent had a significantly more positive attitude 
toward doing that assignment than subjects who were not 
given a choice. This finding probably has practical signifi-
cance as well as statistical significance. The effects of 
the Choice variable may be better seen by ignoring the 
insignificant Incentive variable and looking at the data 
divided into only two groups, Choice and No Choice. Only six 
subjects in the Choice groups gave negative attitude rating 
scores of four or less to the assignment, while 34 gave 
positive attitude rating scores of five or hi~;her. In the No 
Choice groups, 25 subjects gave negative attitude rating scorea, 
while only 15 gave positive attitude rating scores. These 
data are presented in Table 9. Such a large difference in 
the number of subjects with negative attitudes toward doing 
an assignment suggests that the Choice variable has practical 
significance for attitude changes in the classroo~. 
GROUPS 
TABLE 9 
FREQUJ£UC IES OF POSITIVE AND NEQA TIVE 
ATTITUDE SCORES,:t FROM ALL SUBJECTS 
DJ THE CHOICE AJID UO CHOICE GROUPS 
POSITIVE SCORES NEGATrvE SCORES 
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1------·----------·-.... -· ---· -------·-~-... ---------. 
Choice )4 6 
Uo Choice 15 25 
*Attitude rating scores of 4 or lower were considered 
to be negative, and rating scores of S or higher were considered 
to be positive. 
CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Implications 
67. 
According to the theory ot cognitive dissonance, 
individueis who choose to do a relatively undesirable task will 
experience cognitive dissonance and will tend to reduce their 
dissonance by enhancing their attitudes toward the taak. The 
results or the current study supported the theory ot cognitive 
dissonance. Students who chose to comply with the experimenter's 
assignment experienced cognitive dissonance. Their knowledge 
that they had chosen to do the reading assignment was dissonant 
with their feeling that they would have preferred going to 
swimming class. This dissonance was a drive stimulus which 
motivated these subjects to reduce their levels or dissonance 
by changing their attitudes about the relative desirability of 
doing the reading assignment as compared to going to swimming 
class. Dissonance reduction may have been evidenced by the 
adoption of a more positive attitude toward doing the reading 
assignment and/or by the adoption of a more negative attitude 
toward going to swim.~ine clasc. Since only the former mode of 
dissonance reduction w~.s of interest in this study. only the 
subsequent attitudes of the students toward doing the reading 
assignment were assessed. '!'he attitudes or the students who were 
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given a choice were found to be more positive than the attitudes 
of those who were not given a choice. 
Those students who were not given a choice as to 
whether to comply with the experimenter's a$s1gnment did not 
experience the dissonance created by the Choice condition. 
They did not choose to do a reading assigruner.lt which was contrary 
to their attitudes of preference for going to sw.tmming class. 
Thus, they were not motivated to a1'lllance their attitudes toward 
the assignment. Their assessed attitudes were round to be less 
positive than the attitudes of the students uho were given a 
choice. 
Choice conditions affect the presence or absence of 
cognitive dissonance, but incentive conditions are not an 
integral part of dissonance theory. Incentive conditions are 
only important in that they affect the relative attractiveness 
oi the choice alternatives. For example, if the subjects in 
the current study had been offered $10 for doine; the 1•eading 
assignment, doing the assigru:i-:;rrt :uight have been more desirable 
than going to swimming class. Therefore, subjects who chose 
to do the reading assignment would not have experienced cognitive 
dissonanee resulting i':com choosin;; a rolat1'raly undesirable 
alternative. 
In the current study, the incentive er~1ployed was a 
promise of course credit. The fact that this incentive had no 
significant effects upon eithc:i: uttitude or performance suggests 
that promising course credit is not equivalent to promising a 
monetary reward. The results showed that the promise of course 
credit did not significantly affect the relative attractiveness 
of the reading assignment or the subjects' performance on that 
assignment. The theoretical implication o! this finding is 
that one may not be able to corr-1pare studies emplo!ring one type 
of incentive with studies employing another type 'Without 
evidence that the two types or incentives are equivalent. 
Experimental I1nplications 
69. 
The procedure employed in the current study seemed to 
provide an adequate test for the experimental hniotheses. The 
attitude rating scale appeared to be quite satisfactory for 
assessing the students' attitudes toward doing the assig-rmient. 
The experimental procedure successfully demonstrated an a,pproach 
for testing dissonance-mediated attitude change in a practical 
school s1tu~tion. 
T'ne failure to find incentive effects leads one to 
question whether this failure may be due to inethodol<.~gical 
inadequacies. The coffprehensieiri test see:-.·iec'! t.o be a satisfactory 
instrument for assessing the sturlents' cor,.prehension, and it 
was administered under good testi~z conditicns. The reading 
and test questions were designed specifically for seventh and 
eighth grade stw:l.ontz, and the cm:-prehension scores obtained 
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indicated that the questions were at an appropriate level of 
difficulty. A more powerful test may have been obtained either 
by using a more homogeneous group in terms of reading ability 
and thereby reducing the error variance, or by statistically 
controlling for differences in reading ability by some procedure 
such as a treatments x levels design. However, the obtained 
differences between the means of the Incentive and No Incentive 
groups would not have approached significance even if the error 
variance were reduced by half. It does not seem likely that 
the failure to find incentive effects can be attributed to a 
lack of power in the statistical test. 
The effectiveness of the incentive manipulation may 
be questioned. Perhaps incentive effects would have been 
obtained if the promise of course credit had been made in 
some other way. Several of the students asked their language 
arts teachers about their scores after the study. So there 
was at least some understanding of and interest in the promised 
course credit. The most likely reason for failing to £ind 
incentive effects seems to be that the promise of course credit 
is not an effective incentive in terms of the kinds of attitudes 
and performance assessed in this study. 
Practical Implications 
This study der;~onstrat.ed coe;nitive dissona.J.ce e.rrects 
in a practical school satti..-,,g. It wa.s a beginning step toward 
realizing the practical value of dissonan~e theory. Perhaps 
the implications o! dissonance theory may be applied a little 
more confidently to the practical school situation in the 
future. 
One itiplication of these findings tor the teacher 
would be that students' attitudes may be enhanced by giving 
them more options or choices. Students who are allowed to 
choose their assignments will have more positive attitudes 
toward doing those assignments and toward school. This imp1i-
cation is consistent with the current trend to~ard allowing 
students to participate in determining what their educational 
experiences shall be. Thia trend should help to improve the 
affective outcomes obtained by schoolst and it should be 
encouraged. 
Another implication ot the .findings would be that 
there may be more effective incentives tor cla.saroom use than 
the so frequently used 71coursc credit. 0 The teacher should 
em.ploy other incentives. Course credit .may be a useful book-
keeping practice, but if it does not a.ff ect the students' 
performance, the practice of attemptirig to motivate students by 
offering course credit must be questioned. 
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72 •. 
Educational psychologists have lieen e.tte11.:ptir..g to bring 
a variety of incentives hack into the classroom. It ie 
generally accepted that the most 1f,1portant kind of ineent1ve ia 
social. Soc:!.al incentives are essentie1 for socialization or 
the child, and they promote learning to work together. They 
should be employed fl:•equently, e.11d they should be available 
to all, regardless or the individual.ts level or attain..~ent. 
Some extL-n.ples are soei~l recognition, 1xraise, positive feedback, 
a smile, or a .frier..dly touch. 
In addition to the social reinforeers, teachers may 
employ more concrete incentives. For example, the child may be 
given checks on a record sheet, stars, tokens, or trEtding $tll'IP•• 
Such incentives are frequently used in eonju.netion with "pertor· 
mance contractstt in Which the child and teacher agree upon a 
given reward for completion of a speeitied a$s1a;nment. Conciete 
incentives may also be employed in order to eliminate undesitfable 
behavior as in "behavior moditieation" prog:rarns. The teacher· 
and child agree that for each specified period that the child 
does not display the undesirable behavio1", a SFecified reward 
will be given. Skillful use or such "token" incentives can 
have a strong impact upon childrer.' s behavior. 
Frequently, in order to make the "token" incentive• 
valuable to the childi the tokens ~ey be used by the child to 
buy eomething or value to him. For example, a given number ot 
earned tokens may be traded in tc the teacher tor a toy, some 
candy, or food item, or a period of "free play." Small rewards 
such as candy corn or M & M candies are also used in more 
restricted settings with children. Such direct, continuous 
reinforcement has not been demonstrated as a practical or 
desirable procedure for general classroom use. However, it ia 
apparent that a wide variety of incentives are available, and 
teachers should make more effective use of them. 
Suggestions tor Further Research 
?'J. 
The current study has verified the proposed relationship 
between a choice given to students and the students' subsequent 
attitudes. Educators could benefit from further study of the 
relationship between choice and attitude change. Similar studies 
may be done employing various kinds of choices in a variety of 
academic situations. Only with repeated study in a variety of 
situations will it be possible to establish the limits within 
which this relationship holds. There may even be some situa-
tions in 'Which an inverse relationship between choice and 
attitude change will be found. Such an inverse relationship 
has been found under given laboratory conditions (Linder, 
Cooper, and Jones, 1967; Holmes and Strickland, 1970; Sherman, 
1970). 
A different approach to studying the relationship 
between choice and attitude change would be possible if an 
instrument were developed to measure the amount of choice that 
a teacher provides. With such an instrument, a study could be 
made of the relationship between the amount of choice available 
in classrooms and the attitudes of the students in those class-
rooms. Developmental patterns might also be described. There 
may be some optimal alllount of freedom of choice for each grade 
level. 
74. 
The current study failed to obtain significant effects 
from the "course credit" incentive.. The promise of course 
credit did not significantly affect students in terms of the 
two dependent variables. This surprising result suggests that 
. 
the effectiveness of commonly used classroom incentives should 
be evaluated. lducators are aware that masses of students are 
disinterested in classroom learning. Part of the solution to 
this problem is the effective use of incentives that make 
learning activities more interesting and satisfying. 
Finally, it would be very interesting to repeat the 
current study with monetary rewards for the incentive. The 
failure to verify hypotheses three and five has been attributed 
to ineffectiveness of the "course credit" incentive as compared 
to monetary reward. This explanation of the negative results 
would be continued if the hypothesized relationships were found 
using a monetary reward. 
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APPENDIX A 
:MATERIALS USED IN THE PILOT STUDY 
ab J umy o~ 
8). 
·: "' ... > c.w 
up of 
p:i.'~ ~ographs .. 
a s:;:a11 
, O~S 
oxen. 
t o tro:r)~ i n t hc:L. 
l t.•".\ L" 7')"·o'h...,' "i 1• i n ... t.lt'-..., k'- i.,J'""' ......, ..... .. w 
'Ji"'. y represe!'tcd .,..,.. ..... iYely , au 
t h.ece i:>Jr;iools ue. e bo.i. r o·1red from Ef:.f~1~;~.an hieroglyphic s . Not many i ns""i·ip .. 
(' ~n f ound.. Tae f .i.rs 
Some years a.f "H" t.. 
Some ot: the S iri tes -went "O'.Uth and eett led in Sout: .l' .... .:..b:i.u, ;.ihc :: e 
"1;,his S 
improve it. '.l'hc: Lr:: -.,:l l a l pha.bet wa8 c arri e:! t.hroughcut Euro:;c enc. t o !. r.c :::·ic::.. . 87. 
Thus, f r oru i t s small beginn1ng s.I?:on: t he Sei::citi; 1;ork:;c!1 1 t ic nl~'hnbe '· has 
e;~C'adually a s sun:cd a . or e a nd mor ·c i nr.90r'"ant pl :::c c i n the "ff:::. i r c of rr!en ) unti l 
t oday -J. t s t ands as one of' man• s gre ::te s t and most. r e n:i:.:drnble invcnt:l..ons. It 
is , pe r haps, man ! s m-:;s t. i mportant t ool.; but excellent tho t;zh l · i s , i t is 
possi ble that s omc ... n ·" now :i. n s chool u ill ::;omc da.y :flnd 8. WU;}~ t o l i:rp:;.·ove i t 
still further. 
Please ansi·:rer the i:'ollo;·:Jng quest·· onr; by circling t.he nu.:r~ber of t,hc cor:-c .. t 
answer. 
Ho~1i d::i.fficult do you th:i.nk this reucEng i s :.: or a f:Lfth g;:adc r! le.ss? 
1. More s j.mpl e tlmn a vc:::·"' ge 
2. 
3 . A li tt:~e ri1ore d.if'fic ult thc.n o.verage 
Much more difficul t t.h ' n avo.::.«:i~c 
5. So dif':i:'jJ.;ult that. n. · r:.y i.7ould uot ui.C.crsto.nd i t . 
To wh1.ch of' the fol l.owing students wcul d :r-e ~'dine o:f "'.:his l evel of' di ff'.culi·.y 
most. 15.kely b~ assigned? 
1 . Fifth. sreders 
2 . Juniel' high ::: t.hool c~: uci.ents 
3. High s .hool Fres:hm8n a.na. Sopho~.ores 
1~. TI:igh s i ;hool Jun:i.o!·s and Sen1o . s 
5 . CoU.eg"~ r;. tucle:nt.s 
Name_,.,..,.,.,,==============-
Directiou:. Place the number ot the word or phrase which should complete e h ot 
tibe tollowinff eentem:e in the blanks before tbe numbers ot the seratemes. 
Example : 
88. 
3 Thia is a teat in (l) ar1tllmet1c (2) epellil!B (3) read.15 (4) geography. 
___ ...... 1. People in the Old Stone Age (1) did not know bow to write or drav 
(2) made crude drav11J8a (3) had a crude alphabet (4) left ·mazq written 
records. 
2. Simple picture vr1t1DB began perhaps (1) 3,000 1ears ago (2) 10,000 
---- years ago (3) 100,000 years 880 (4) l,000,000 years aao. 
3. Thia st ory states that pictures ot ar:U.mal.a made thousands of y ars 86<> 
---....- have been found 1D a cave in Cl ) Spain (2) .Ezaal&Dd. (3) Americ 
(4) Africa • 
..._ ___ 4. llieroalyphic writ ing (l) is tbe l east ad:van:ed stage ot vritins 
(2 ) ia the same aa picture writins (3) grew out of picture vritins 
(4) uses u alphabet. 
5. When the white man came t o America the India.ne (l) could not write 
------· at all (2) uH<\ picture vri ia.g (3) used syllable writing (4) had a 
crude alphabet. 
6. 'l'be outstencU.118 t t about b1eros}¥phic vrit1ns is that <1> it 1• cut 
---- in at one (2) 1t can. be read veey easily (3) it 1• th most ancient 
wr1t.1q (4) it is made up or recognizable picturee. 
_ 1. Cuneiform vrii11?8 was made on (l) bricks (2) atone (3) papyrus 
---- (4) tree bark. 
____ 8. Sip or pict ure a used to express ideas not related in a direct and 
natural way to the pictures are called (1) pictographs (2) alphabet1e 
writi11.g (3) ideosraphs (4) inscript ions. 
·---9· People be~ to discard pictograph vriti.Da when they (1) began 11"11136 
i n caves (2) began to make records on papyrus (3) came to settle in 
vilJ.ases and t owns (4) decided to invent an,alpbabet. 
10. Syllable writ iog is (1) more advanted than writ1118' with ideographs 
---- (2) less advanced tbaD Wl'it1Dg With ideOll'&phs (3) about as advanf:ed 
a11 a.l.pbabet1c vrit1D.S (4 ) less advanced than pictographic vrit1Di. 
____ u. Syl 3bl writing is uaed toda.J in (l) India (2 ) Ruaaia (3) Arabi 
(4) China. · . 
_ ___ 12. • ~ alphabet wa invented by the (1) Seiritee (2) Egyptians 
(3) Phoenicians (4) Babylonians. 
89. 
____ 13. The t1ret alphabet cou1sted ot ( l ) consocants and vowels {2 ) con• 
aoaaDt• (3 ) Yowels (4) pictographa. 
____ 1~4. The S iritea (1) conquered tbe Rgyptians (2) vere conquered b)' the 
EaPt ians (3 ) were desceDdanta ot the Egyptians (4) were employed 
b;y the El)"ptiana . 
___ _.15. '1'he alphabet was probab~ illvent.ed 111 connection with (1) the report.a 
ot generala about their Yictories in war (2) the writings ot ancient 
scholars (3) the reports ot roremen about their work (4) the 1nscr1p-
t1ona on the tombs ot k1Dsa. 
____ 16. The ,people who invented the alphabet left the region 1n which they 
11-nd and took tboir alphabet to other parts ot the world because 
(1) tbeJ vere driwn out (2) tbe mi.nee 111 which the;y worked were 
closed (3) the7 were nomada who did not lik to stay in one plac;e 
ver, long (4) the pastures tor their flocks were used up. 
____ 17. Traders vho did a great deal to spread the alphabet to Europe were 
the (1) PhoeDicianB (2) Aramaeane (3~ Hebrews (4) Greeks. 
18. The t1rat people to uae the alphabet tor more important writiq than 
---- business .records and tombstone 1Decr1pt1ona were the l ) Seiriwe 
(2) ArM!8RDB (3 ) Bebreva (4) Greeks. 
19. The Creeks (1) Paaaed the alpbabe't on to the La~ina uncbang 4 
---- (2) a1mpl1t1ed it (3) improved it (4) completeq revi~ed i t. 
20. For the art ot vr1t1DS ve are 1Ddebtecl to (1) a small group ot men 
- --- (2) scholars (3) one nation (4) llllu..Y ditterent peoples. 
90. 
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91. 
) tl 
"'tolle .ge . 
'.; 
>,,.) - 1_. 
L.!U 
sign in 
f .r , nt c. ;f 
f you know t1 e 
oxen. 
need to w.ri te a· '.:t t''fai ·s or c;ovcn: 1:.rr.ent. 
94. 
100'!::.s i.u 
It r(;mt ir~t: fo~: "~ "'! e ... irit·':'~; 1 a ri: - !:er'!; p::iopJ.tO? eopJ. ~ .. ~ -1 ·~ -r 1.-:i1e E[Jyptior~ :r . , .. .... ,) 
t o il04"k in -;_}JC r 1ti.nc s rn i;ht; :p<:m:i.nstil" o·r c~ u ~~o P"'"··? c J. h aT 'pt1"- ~ 1; f$ '.J. II ............. "_, 
1 
l'he Si;irl.~ al.ph;:l.b t corrni si;r~d of t;wenty ... on\!? symbols. N arly all 
r.c:.:;Js • 
5. 
So the Seirites wJ.10 4: 0 •. d no~ ri1F.!1:e a J .. i-vinP: it. :~t desert :.:e~ .ior. c.fter ·.':e 
Some of tbe Sei .itc;s ·wen~ sc·,1th and settl d i · Sm1i;h Arab:i.o wLc:.:e 
a .:phti et . 
o .. tl: e tr; i v i l i zed worl d. 
improved it. The L~tin olphatet. Ha s c:J:_· .... ·ied throuchc.ut· ~~u 'Gtc> end to .~.s:eric;}.. 96. 
Thus, frorn :i.ts sm~1.l be i nning G.l!lOl ~ the SeirJ.t·_') wo:t ·r1cn) t he r:l:!_)i '"'. et ho.r: 
gradually assum2d a.. ·r:or e a d n:.ore i-:r;. o::tant :plcc; c in t"1e a:fTs.lr;; of i:r:en, until 
t orlay i t s t an s as o.e of u:an 's g:;:entest nnd. ;:ios t r2rcc. .. lrnble invcnt:i. ns. It 
:tsJ pe:rhaps , 110.n ~ s most impor tant t ool_, but c::~eJ.leni; :;houch i t i s, i i:. i s 
possible that s omeone now in s r:ho l wi.~l so· iC clay f' l ud 8. wu·· t o :l prov· i t 
still furt her. 
Please arn:mer t.te :follm7inz qu.;.:s t.fon" by c i:tcl1.ng t.he number of' the i.·o -r-c <~~., 
answer . 
How d.if:f'icul t do you t hink t his r eading is f 0::.~ a f lfth g::at1e .1 ss? 
1. More s 'mple t hen average 
2. Averag'': 
3. A l.:i.tt:i.e ttor.e d:Lf'firult, i-.l~an 'vcrn ,e 
h. 'f.~1;.r;L. more d.i.ffic lt han .:ivc:::.·aGC 
5. So dif':~:i.r;;ult tho.t, mn :y ~muld no·r. underst.ri. nd i"'· . 
T "''h:i.ch o:f the fellowing st.ud.~nt.s wculd ::eo.ding of ~:Y s lcv'<:'l o:t' d:1.ffi c.ul +y 
most l'.'kely b~ assigned? 
2. Sunier· hig!1 school r.tuG.en-.. s 
3 . m.gh s ~hool Fr·~shrec::u ai.d Sophomores 
l~ . Figh s d1ool ·un:Lors ond Senio:i:·s 
5. CoDlegc. stuci.ent.s 
r 
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98. 
WlfUOK AND HER CJB 
·h:roat from t ime '!Po ill'~, S: r. ii ad beer:. more -tnan a _ay si~£!"' 
1.he surf'e:ce of' tJ:ie l;•1::t.'ll.~ -or~· moon. 
I "". 
• I 
a. ~·1sk ox · -? ·'O.. 
sb · p. 
99. 
~he bt;-ar ~:ea "ht"''i tm~m: she ..:as on. ron::· d by 3!n n11b:roke-:1 ;ir~lP of ::ib...·1.rp ;"' t"vr•d 
tO~"IlS. 
".; reuibling caJ..vee c llind ·\Jlem, and evei·yt-1h .. re their f'ront :rerm.inad untroken. 01:>s;;:!' 
or ur1ce 1;,he !:-ear rus1'ed fo1-vai· ~, as if int.en.ding to ~berg i api: A of all 
~.onseque. ices, on 
gle.n~e, ehe lux"'i~d away, fo.Utoved by her :u"b, i see.1::.b. of easier pr l • 
·n1sa.ppolnted by th'? m1JSk o·{e , the baar r.ieer d into ev~;;.-y nook il" 
.!'llllf'..y es she moved e~rosa th'" frozen 1:-tildern~es huri:tlnf! for foOO.. Her ... o~u-s~ 
l?he.re 1;.'!le hlar.k wt~1 ;..losic· to the ehoro bad .. egun to sk m o er in ·~ . oJ.d. 
'i"'l.li. ll'aS · n old 111 -wilo weighed. al· of J..1 prmrde. H had · di! gy, r.; -i.' "' 
100. 
W:tr:.h.o· ~ ...:. so;lnd., ~:.he whi" e bioar diaappoarerJ. ~r 1:~ du'•k ll:ke e. t_~bos·~ 
htu1'1 ress r·erM:hed i~'l:le ellore at, a poin hid'1.en by lwaped masses of ii&e .from ,_. e 
.her ble.~k ll!'lssle shOlrin;J a O\"~ the s rf" e. Wt.en at las~ she re~hed a p io:',,, in 
·.-a a shadow. 
air with his sensitive nostrils and :r-.-a.~y e{; tlle first. ;:;igh.t, eound , or S' .en" of 
·pen aea which h hsd just le~. Sudd.eilly hio keen ea.rs aught. the sonna of 
t.ave bei:>n made by floctin ~ ... e. llow ver, the r;1o~to of :hi:? wb seal is~ "Make> 
Wherefore, this one, at "•he f'iT.st sl gh souud oo .. 1n.d. hi:m, smmg a.ro.u.nd, 
water. Few land an:tmale, ind.,,oo, vo...U.d dare the '1.eptht:i t.rith s~b. a svimMr. 
101. 
a feast; of :ri h, p•n"e J l Jf~ -g:i.vir:g eeal w.ca ';. 
3 ~ 1 mH;her liked. r tU.~Uki:-d rs.:·::ub~g it. 
1.t :! .U.k~~ reading i•'-~·~ . 
5 . ,,!;. liked. re-dilr,g H. very l!:U.\!h. 
1. I 'WO\ild. be otrori:g y op osed t.O> r.:'f ?"f! :l~. 
2. T. li'0 11lci. pret'!'r lb~-:·.:... ~;o ~.u 1t. 
'.:t 
.. ,. ~ ! ·1·muld Ot, ~lll:'e' • 
l ~ r ~1Ci!ll ill:e ~",O d.1. i ... 
r :>~ I WC'\ild like ~o do 1~ ,erv ~;.~b 
Di rec f j oua · .Plu .... e t ne rim· •er of rl;c wo1·d. -:>r phrao,.. \Hll ;11 snc!.l.ld. r.cmp1P- e eacn 
of 1 he :; olloi-7 ng c:: :c cn'"es i1 ... lle bla ks before t11~ n .. mci;r of 
Example: 
______ l . 
___ 2 . 
'·he senieires 
' he t:':uo Yhiml_)ercd. heca·;s• 'l} he 'l<.ras t:old 2) Le i;ro.s "'"ire1 
(3) t.e was h rngry (4) he was lost. (5) h~. uas a 'raid. · 
•rhe f irst kill the bear ade wus (l) a r.;a.ir ol' r tffed gro· ,se 
{2) a. pair of ;r'·armige.n {3) a white ra.bb•.t {ld a yo\mg deer 
{5) a musk ox. 
When ·o:he bear ca .•. ghi. sl({ . of the musk oxen sh .. (l. s ·opped and 
wat-;hed. ~i;hem (2l n.tGhed at them at, on-:;e '3) e.p >roa.r-ted tllem 
('QUtiously (4) ""ried o reep ap to them {5} nu.de a wi(le ce: o ,r 
:;ro md them. 
___ 4. 'As soon s.s th y sau the bea.r, 'f'-he lit ·1e bulls (1) ~mng o meet 
her {2) ~"Usi d u , he?.' (3) s a.> .. ·eri.?d in ell dir? ... ions (Id e~ up 
c lo i be) le ing (5) deser·t '1 t.he cows d. cal : 0 a. 
-~---5· 
1. 
-
__ 8. 
-.......~ ...... _9. 
-~--10 .. 
T..i:le b~ar re rea · d frci:t the musk oxen as if in ter1·nr be aust• 
ahe (l) ~s afraid of' ~r.e bulls (2) wan ;ed the 11 o think sn .. -
iiad gene mr~y .3) i:as an:d.O'.lS for thP- sc. e y or tie. ub (. ) hol:'ed 
to ~ p·i:rsued (5} vas t. P- ayf1J.l r.1000. 
iif' er -ho bca1· 1 r·:· the musk ox herd, s!H~ :ovei (l} o·.it, "'pon 
1,lle open pl11n (2) · owa.rcl a range of' men "'·.i:.i1rn (3l alo11g r1il~r 
(l!,) dow.n a rarrow gort;e (!"J :oward ille op1m sea . 
When she ne"'rd. ,he inkle of. brea.ld.ng ice, the bear (1) o~hf'd 
lo~• (2) ron •ow.rd t;he so ' (3) looked e.ll al: cu"". he!:' !;.) e:nif." tl 
"the eir (5) ;- shed the cub to cafe :y. 
As the b.:ar crc11t 'upon 1 he eec.l, he cu ( ) 1 ol1.mre1l 'be hlr·d rwr 
{? s~.ood a. a dis anr.:e cmd wa1 ... hcd {3) ~2· ,. r-red euind some 
<oe P~) whiurpered :l.n an.-ciety { 5) began t o hovJ • 
The ·eal was pr.ep$:red i'or an at-'.a ··k from ~l, r. ny sidP {2) ~ nc 
land. ('3} .h" open sen. (Id any d.i·c .t:lo P.X cp~ the south b) .. he 
nor".;!, and -.. s • 
lhen ~-he se· l ··rent do~n'l in o i·.he \m~ .r, th 
.. o loo·~en h .. r g ip {2) sprar:g fter iiim (3 
;:mv"h 'for her " I , i::anlt her -teeth deep-'l' 5 · .·? 
-r.ovEU'.'d him. 
ou1i·~0d 
s too 
mmn 
103. 
APPENDIX D 
RAW DATA 
104. 
RAW DATA FOR THE CHOICE-INCENTIVE GROUP 
Name Attitude Traxler Iowa 
Score Raw Percentile 
Score Score 
Ricky F. 7 9 46 
Ed s. 6 g 44 
Roger T. 7 5 55 
Joe c. 7 5 69 
Jon w. 6 5 65 
De.nnis H. 6 9 71 
Jack M. g 10 82 
Steward M. 9 9 85 
I~Iartin B. 7 2 29 
Brent B. 7 6 27 
John K. 9 5 )l 
Mike N. g 6 57 
Tom M. 7 6 51 
Steve C. 7 9 89 
Mike W. 6 4 6) 
Rich C. 6 6 35 
Kevin L. 6 9 88 
David R. 8 6 63 
Jim P. 7 s 81 
Ed T. 6 6 55 
105. 
RAW DAT.A. FOR 'l*HE NO CHOICE-NO IllJCENTIVE GROUP 
Attitude Trwer lows. . Name 
Score Raw Percentile 
Score Score 
Don o. 3 4 2l 
Roger 13. 7 s 42 
Willie W. 6 7 44 
Paul H. s 8 46 
Don D. ; 6 55 
Bruce G. 6 6 63 
Jeff o. ; 3 61 
Jim Q. .) 2 63 
Ron H. 6 5 61 
Terry G. 5 s 71 
Steve w. ; ; 74 
Dan R. 4 3 46 
Ralph B. 5 3 59 
Jim R. 4 9 51 
Paul T. 7 8 67 
Mike L. 9 9 71 
Brian F. 4 9 82 
Mike C. 4 4 26 
David s. ; 3 '¥/ 
'l'om B. 7 7 84 
106. 
RAW DATA FOR THE NO CHOICE-INCENTIVE GROUP 
Name Att1.tude TraXJ.er Iowa 
Score Raw Percentile 
Score Score 
Tom w. 5 2 47 
Wayne H. 5 3 53 
Mike B. 7 7 55 
Mike JC. 7 s 63 
Jim o. 3 4 61 
John L. 10 8 76 
John E. 8 3 33 
Kevin s. 5 9 85 
Jim M. s 6 88 
Marks. 6 3 21 
lten P. 5 2 35 
Martin L. 7 ; 33 
Mike c. 5 3 53 
Steve B. 5 5 53 
Jim N. 4 6 61 
Kent M. 3 10 85 
Jim c. 7 5 88 
Steve N. 5 7 67 
Bob S. 8 7 SS 
Ralph B. 5 5 39 
107. 
RAH DATA FOE THE CHOICE-NO INCENTI'!E GROUP 
Name Att!tuae frwer ?owa 
Score Raw Percentile 
Score Score 
Richard F. g 4 26 
Perry K. 9 2 33 
!~ark s. 7 g 67 
!<iike K. 4 6 67 
Jetf M. 6 9 76 
Bob C. g 8 71 
Bob N. g 6 ;7 
Norm B. 4 5 61 
Brett H. 6 7 63 
Doug w. 7 3 59 
Ji.in H. g 5 22 
Steve K. 7 6 22 
Bob C. 7 2 57 
Tony s. 7 7 71 
Jim P. ; 4 76 
George M. 7 ; 29 
Carry J~. 5 2 31 
Bob S. ; 5 ;; 
Mike L. 2 6 55 
Greg K. 6 5 87 
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